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Introduction
Microfinance is the provision of financial
services, such as credit, savings, and insur-
ance services, to those who are most likely to be
denied access to the traditional banking system.
A typical client for a microfinance institution
(MFI) is a person too poor to pay usual bank fees
for savings accounts or other services or to pro-
vide sufficient collateral to back loans. Micro-
finance aims to bring out the skills of the poor
and allow them to propel themselves out of
poverty through providing financial services
with which they can protect assets and grow
microenterprises. MFIs have developed many
innovative financial products to offer their
clients beyond credit, such as microsavings,
money transfer vehicles, and microinsurance.
Microfinance is a growing industry through-
out the developing world and comprises com-
mercial banks, regulated banks, nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs), and nonprofit
organizations (NPOs). With approximately 17
million impoverished, there is a large market
for the microfinance industry to capture; yet, in
Colombia, it is not nearly as well established
as in neighboring countries. Peru and Bolivia,
for example, are among the world’s most com-
petitive and innovative microfinance markets
(The World Factbook). This article tackles the
question, Why is the Colombian microfinance
industry lagging compared to that of some of its
neighbors?
The article begins with an introduction
to the Colombian economy and economic con-
ditions in Colombia. It then outlines the history
of microfinance and how it moved into Colom-
bia. From there, the article compares the
Colombian microfinance industry with micro-
finance industries throughout Latin America to
provide a frame of reference for its development
in Colombia. This comparison leads to the
thesis, that the financial regulatory system in
place in Colombia is restricting growth of the
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microfinance industry and hindering its abil-
ity to reach the same level of development
seen in Colombia’s neighbors. Wrapping up
the article are recommendations that may
help the Colombian microfinance industry grow
and provide beneficial financial services to more
of those in poverty.
Colombian Economy
Microfinance aims to help alleviate
poverty and provide opportunities for microen-
terprises to grow. Unemployment is particularly
difficult to measure in Colombia due to the sig-
nificant number of people employed in the
informal sector (see article by Peterson in
this issue). In 2011, Colombia had the high-
est unemployment among similarly developed
countries in Latin America, at 10.8 percent.
Although the overall GDP of the economy was
third in the region that year, with $321 bil-
lion, inequity in the country has grown, leav-
ing millions in poverty (The World Factbook).
The World Bank’s Gini index, measuring the
extent to which the distribution of income devi-
ates from a perfectly equal distribution, is
55.9 as of 2010. A perfectly equal income dis-
tribution would have a Gini index of 0. Swe-
den has the lowest income inequality glob-
ally, with a Gini index of 23, and the United
States has an index of 45, showing how high
inequality is in Colombia (World Bank). The
poverty rate in 2010 stood at 37.2 percent of the
population, with approximately 17 million
Colombian citizens living below the poverty
line (The World Factbook).
With such a high number of impoverished
people in Colombia, there is a large potential
microfinance clientele. In 2012, Colombian
MFIs had 2.3 million borrowers and offered
deposit services to 6.2 million savers (MixMar-
ket). It is difficult to determine how many of
these clients actually had incomes below the
poverty line. Nevertheless, these numbers show
that millions of impoverished Colombians
remain without access to financial services. The
microfinance industry in Colombia has a huge
opportunity to serve these people and attempt
to reduce poverty. However, the Colombian
microfinance industry lags behind many other
countries in Latin America, notably Peru and
Bolivia. 
History and Origin of Microfinance
One of the most difficult features about liv-
ing in poverty is escaping from it. The poorest
of the poor have limited access to financial
outlets to borrow and save money. With credit,
the poor can make large purchases for maintain-
ing microenterprises, home repairs, or gen-
eral consumption needs that are otherwise unat-
tainable. Savings services provide the poor with
safe options for accumulating wealth and help
smooth consumption or help pay for large
purchases or events, such as weddings or funer-
als. Like the rich, the poor desire insurance to
help protect against the unexpected. Microfi-
nance attempts to relieve the burden of some of
these issues by providing financial services to
the typically “unbankable” (Rutherford and
Sukhwinder).
Reducing poverty has been a goal of many
organizations across the globe, but microfi-
nance was the first institution to offer sustain-
able financial products to the world’s poor.
Muhammad Yunus is noted as one of the first to
propose that the poor may be able to pull them-
selves out of poverty if they are given access to
credit. Yunus’ first loan, a mere $27, was given
in 1976 to a group of villagers in Bangladesh.
This group of borrowers set the stage for Yunus’
creation of the first large-scale MFI in
Bangladesh, the Grameen Bank, established in
1983 (Yunus).
Although Yunus is often labeled the father
of microfinance, the NPO, Accion, was actu-
ally the first to start microfinance, in 1973.
Accion was founded in Venezuela by Joseph
Blatchford in 1961 when he was a law student
at the University of California, Berkeley. Later,
Accion workers in Recife, Brazil, worked with
microenterprises and issued the first experimen-
tal microcredit loan. Accion’s microfinance
operators have since spread, with branches
not only in Latin America but also in Africa,
Asia, and the United States (Accion).
Informal Banking
Microfinance has taken many lessons from
informal methods of saving and lending used by
the poor, such as savings clubs and moneylend-
ers. There are two main types of savings clubs—
rotating savings and credit associations and
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accumulated savings and credit associations.
Both use systems where each member puts a
predetermined amount of money into a pot of
funds and a member gets to receive this lump
sum at a certain time. Accumulated savings and
credit associations often act as a type of insur-
ance because they allow members to take funds
in emergencies. These informal savings clubs
are generally self-managed by the involved
participants and rely on social sanctions, trust,
and a deep knowledge of the other group mem-
bers’ characters. Similarly, the use of social
sanctions and community relationships have
been integrated into the group lending method-
ology for microfinance. The nearly universal use
of these informal practices throughout the
developing world, particularly widespread in
Africa and Asia, demonstrates the high need
for financial services by the poor, especially sav-
ings, insurance, and loans (Rutherford and
Sukhwinder).
Moneylenders are another informal source
of credit for the poor but can charge extremely
high fees for their services. Some interest rates
charged by moneylenders reach as high as 50
percent per day (Robinson). There are lessons to
learn from moneylenders, however, that MFIs
use in their methods of lending. Moneylenders
know their clients personally, which helps
build trust between borrower and lender. Mon-
eylenders are available to their clients quickly
and locally in the community, a convenience
to clients. Furthermore, moneylenders often
have systems of increasing loan amounts with
consistent repayment as a form of incentive. The
high interest rates charged by moneylenders—
empirical studies have found that 45 percent
of money-lending rates are above a 25 percent
monthly effective interest rate—prove that there
is a high demand by the poor for access to credit
(Robinson). These services provide great value
to the poor; otherwise, they would not subject
themselves to the high rates. MFIs have uti-
lized many aspects of the informal methods
while providing financial services to the poor
at generally much lower rates, although still
high by developed economy standards.
Microfinance in Latin America
Microfinance is in different levels of devel-
opment throughout Latin America and the
Caribbean. Bolivia and Peru have some of the
most developed and successful MFIs in the
region. Despite its proximity to both, Colom-
bia lags in its development of microfinance in
comparison. Some of the differences in micro-
finance development stem from the variations
in economies throughout the region. Countries
in Latin America are at widely different stages
of economic development, requiring that MFIs
have different target markets, lines of services,
and regulatory frameworks. 
Colombia has the potential to become one
of the strongest microfinance industries in Latin
America. Colombia is the third largest micro-
finance market in terms of number of clients in
Latin America, behind Mexico and Peru (both of
which have markets nearly double the size of
Colombia’s). Unfortunately, Colombia covers
only 13.6 percent of the potential market—a
small portion of market coverage compared with
Peru with 26.2 percent and Bolivia with 55.7
percent coverage. In contrast, Colombia’s neigh-
bor Venezuela covers approximately only 0.8
percent of its microfinance market potential, the
smallest coverage in all of Latin America.
Colombia may not be in the worst position,
but in a ranking on market penetration relative
to full market potential, Colombia falls 14th
globally in the rankings; Peru and Bolivia both
secure high spots at numbers two and three
in this measure (Marulanda and Otero). Clearly,
Colombian microfinance has a lot of room for
growth and improvement.
So what is keeping Colombia’s microfi-
nance industry from reaching the levels of mar-
ket penetration found in Peru and Bolivia?
One of the main differences is regulatory envi-
ronments. The essential reason that regula-
tion matters (discussed in detail later) is that
it allows regulated banks to hold deposits,
increases transparency, and keeps the banking
system afloat. Unregulated MFIs cannot take
deposits, significantly restricting the range of
services they may offer and limiting an impor-
tant source of funds. Throughout Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean, there are many more
nonregulated MFIs than regulated MFIs. As of
2005, Latin America and the Caribbean had 98
regulated MFIs compared with 238 nonregu-
lated MFIs. Peru is an outlier in this figure—
Peru has more regulated MFIs than nonregu-
lated, at 43 and 24 MFIs, respectively. Similarly,
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Bolivia may have fewer regulated MFIs (7)
than nonregulated (14) but the number of
borrowers in regulated MFIs (308,978) is signif-
icantly higher than the number of borrowers in
nonregulated MFIs (239,264), so the market
penetration in Bolivia is done largely by regu-
lated MFIs (Berger et al.). Colombia’s microfi-
nance industry has five regulated MFIs com-
pared with 17 nonregulated MFIs at the time the
Inter-American Development Bank took its sur-
vey in 2006; although the number of regu-
lated MFIs has increased, the borrowers in
Colombia still primarily borrow from nonreg-
ulated MFIs.
Colombia is making progress in keeping
up with Peru and Bolivia by adding more reg-
ulated MFIs to the market, but many nonreg-
ulated MFIs remain hesitant to switch because
of Colombia’s unfavorable regulatory environ-
ment. The largest deterrent keeping MFIs from
becoming regulated institutions is the interest
rate ceiling, at 39.89 percent; neither Peru
nor Bolivia has interest rate caps. Since 2000,
Colombia has set an interest rate cap at the
usury interest rate, which is defined as 1.5 times
that of the current banking interest (Castel-
lanos, p. 2). This restriction discourages MFIs
from switching to becoming regulated, with
Bancolombia and Banco Caja Social (BCSC)
leading the NPOs (Berger et al.). The largest
NGO network of MFIs practicing microfinance
in Colombia is the Women’s World Banking
(WWB) organization, which has three branches
in Colombia.
WWB is one of the largest MFIs globally.
WWB operates in many countries in Latin
America, including Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Dominican Republic, Mexico, Paraguay, and
Peru, in addition to its work in Colombia. WWB
may be the most notable case for the differ-
ence in regulatory regimes in Colombia com-
pared to its more developed neighbors. WWB
remains an NGO in all of its branches operating
in Colombia, which include FMM Popayán, Fun-
dación WWB Colombia, and Fundación Delamu-
jer, whereas WWB is formalized and regulated
in all other Latin American countries in which
it operates. WWB chooses to remain an NGO
because it is afraid of “the negative effects of
operating under the regulatory regime in their
country, which does not have any special treat-
ment for microfinance entities, restricts their
operational flexibility, and creates an additional
cost structure and risks that they do not want
to assume” (Marulanda and Otero, p. 10). WWB
affiliates found sufficient financing for their
growth from donors and second tier and com-
mercial banks in Colombia, allowing them to
continue to lend to their clients. As long as they
remain unregulated, they cannot be self-sustain-
ing by funding through savings services they
would be able to offer if they were a regulated
entity.
Best Practices for Regulating
Microfinance
So what might Colombia do to better fos-
ter the industry? Regulation and supervision
in the financial system determine the types 
of permitted activities in which certain cate-
gories of financial institutions are allowed to
engage. Regulations also enforce requirements
on financial institutions that are intended to
keep the financial system and all unintended
externalities safe. The microfinance industry
is unique in the financial system because of
the diversity of entities that offer microfi-
nance services. Some countries have devel-
oped unique regulatory frameworks for micro-
finance whereas other countries have ignored
the microfinance industry altogether, restrict-
ing MFIs to remain mostly donor-driven NGOs
and NPOs. Best practices for microfinance
regulation and the successful regulatory
regimes in Peru and Bolivia are discussed and
compared with those in Colombia. 
Deposits
Deposit-holding functions in MFIs are
both helpful for the depositor and for the MFI
itself in becoming sustainable. The depositor
benefits from having a safe place to store money
and accumulate savings. It is often difficult to
save money when it is hidden at home because
of the likelihood of people trying to steal the
money. People also tend to spend their or their
family member’s money more when it is more
easily available.
The MFI benefits from holding deposits
because it can become more self-sustaining.
Deposits are a low-cost source of funds to lend
back to clients. Also, adding deposit-holding
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services adds costs to an MFI from an increased
demand for staff and for record keeping. Caudill,
Gropper, and Hartarska studied the cost-effec-
tiveness over time of MFIs in Europe and Cen-
tral Asia. The results revealed a split of the MFIs
into two groups: MFIs that become more cost-
effective over time and those that show no
improvements. The main difference between the
two groups was the level of reliance on subsi-
dies for a source of funding. Those less reliant
on subsidies and more reliant on deposits were
more cost-effective. The more cost-effective
group had several thousand times the volume
of deposits and more than five times the total
assets compared to the MFIs in the subsidy-
driven group. The large size of these MFIs
may indicate that they are issuing larger loans
and lending to more than just MFI clients,
improving cost-effectiveness. The empirical
results of this study suggest that an increase
in regulated, deposit-holding MFIs would bet-
ter enable Colombia’s microfinance industry
to follow the growth trends found in this study
and reach more of the potential microfinance
market.
Without being a regulated institution, an
MFI cannot hold deposits. Compared to Bolivia
and Peru, Colombia has few regulated MFIs.
In Colombia, BCSC holds nearly all of the
deposits, with 5.2 million depositors and a total
balance of deposits of $3.8 billion. The bank’s
average loan is $4,739 while its average deposit
balance is $739. The imbalance most likely
results from offering deposits to more of the
country’s poor than the bank does. BCSC, a
Jesuit social welfare savings bank founded in
1911, is a unique case in Colombia. It serves
both low-income and medium-income Colom-
bians, not just microfinance clients, which
makes analysis of this bank difficult. By com-
parison, another regulated deposit-holding
Colombian MFI, Bancamía, has a deposit bal-
ance of $65.6 million and 322,697 depositors.
There are other deposit-holding MFIs in Colom-
bia, but a vast majority of MFIs do not carry
deposits—depriving many poor of a much-
needed financial service. BCSC offering these
deposits to so many of the poor is certainly ben-
eficial to those families, but BCSC’s large scale
may inhibit smaller MFIs from entering the
game, wary of such a large competitor. And
for those that have entered, BCSC’s domi-
nance forces these small MFIs to continue to
lend at a higher cost than they would be able
to reach with a sound base of deposits. In
Bolivia, the largest holders of deposits are
BancoSol, Banco FIE, and EcoFuturo. BancoSol
has 484,973 depositors with a deposit balance of
$536.2 million; Banco FIE has a deposit balance
of $491.9 million from 476,870 depositors;
and EcoFuturo has 162,005 depositors and a
balance of $110.9 million. Among these top
three there is a more competitive balance with
regard to depositors versus Colombia (Mix-
Market). Bolivia has just over 5 million citi-
zens in poverty whereas Colombia has more
than 3 times that, which explains the lower
numbers of depositors comparatively in Bolivia
(The World Factbook). Peru’s microfinance
industry is similar to Bolivia’s in its spread of
deposit-holding institutions. The top three
deposit-holding MFIs in Peru are Crediscotia
(528,876 depositors with a balance of $681
million), CMAC Arequipa (462,722; $676.4
million), and MiBanco (570,782; $1.4 billion).
Comparing these figures to Colombia’s Ban-
camía shows how much room there is for the
savings sector within the microfinance indus-
try to grow.
As in Peru, Bolivia’s microfinance indus-
try is funded mainly through deposits. After the
liberalization that followed Bolivia’s hyperinfla-
tion in the mid-1980s (i.e. closures of govern-
ment banks and elimination of interest rate con-
trols), the Superintendencia de Bancos y
Entidades Financieras (SBEF), the Bolivian
financial regulator, shifted its focus of regula-
tion from institutional type to, instead, the char-
acteristics of loans. This led the SBEF to reduce
requirements for loan collateralization and to
emphasize analysis of borrower cash flows,
which encouraged more institutions to become
regulated. This in turn spurred a sharp increase
in depositors. The increase in competition
among banks in Bolivia reduced interest rates
and led to innovative lending techniques. The
changes in regulatory framework and the
emphasis on financial inclusion for all citizens
has increased the importance of microfinance
in the financial industry in Bolivia—microfi-
nance accounts for 37 percent of all financial
activity in the country (Vogel, p. 12). Since
the reformation of the regulatory environ-
ment in Bolivia, the number of microfinance
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depositors has soared to 2 million people.
Colombia should consider following Bolivia’s
lead and focus its regulation on the type of serv-
ices offered rather than the characteristics of the
institution as a whole, which would allow
more banks to offer microfinancial services, in
particular savings. Bringing both savings and
lending services into one bank improves con-
venience for clients by keeping all of their finan-
cial services with one institution.
Prudential Regulation
Prudential regulation refers to the regula-
tions applied to institutions that hold deposits.
The importance of this regulation is both to pro-
tect uninformed depositors from potential risks
the deposit-holding institution is taking and
to protect the deposit-taking institution against
the failure to reduce potential banking collapse.
Lending-only MFIs do not need prudential
regulation because they are not taking others’
money—depositors are safe. Prudential regula-
tion protects the financial system from failure
as a result of the domino effect of one failure
leading to another failure as well as protecting
depositors who do not have the ability to care-
fully monitor the bank themselves. The diffi-
culty with prudential regulation for MFIs is that
compliance with prudential regulation is com-
plex, expensive, and often difficult. This is also
true for the enforcement of prudential regula-
tions where many regulators and supervisors are
already understaffed or at capacity (Christen
et al.).
Bank supervision has a focus on the cap-
ital adequacy ratio (CAR), which helps meas-
ure the prudential risk of an institution by
calculating the ratio of equity to risk-weighted
assets. The higher this ratio, the less risk there
is for the financial system and depositors. How-
ever, because retained deposits are a major
source of measured equity, retaining deposits
also implies that there is less funding avail-
able to use for loans or other investments. As
discussed previously, MFIs that are funded by
more deposits have more potential for growth,
in turn furthering the goal of the microfi-
nance industry to extend the provision of finan-
cial services. The Consultative Group to Assist
the Poor best practices suggest that the CAR
should be higher for MFIs than typical banks for
various reasons. First, because MFI loans are
uncollateralized, there is nothing to back the
loans in case of delinquency. The delinquency
rates for microloans are notoriously low because
the borrowers must pay back their loans in
order to get another loan. However, studies have
found that delinquency has a contagious effect:
when one borrower chooses not to pay back a
loan, others tend to soon follow. For instance,
there have been several microfinancial crises
across the globe, such as in Nicaragua, India,
Morocco, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Nicaragua
dominoed into crisis in the No Pago political
movement, where, with political support from
the ruling party, borrowers collectively decided
to default on their loans, a movement which
spread throughout the country. India suffered a
similar politically fueled repayment crisis (Chen
et al.). Episodes such as these put MFIs at seri-
ous risk without a base of capital. Additionally,
because the interest rates on microloans are
higher than normal rates—data indicate the
average rate in Colombia is around 35 percent
but with a high concentration of loan prod-
ucts around the regulatory cap 40 percent effec-
tive interest rate—the delinquency of one loan
has harsher revenue implications for an MFI
than a single delinquency does for a regular
bank (“Colombia . . .”). Another major reason
for keeping the CAR high is that the supervisory
boards in many countries where microfinance
is prevalent are not very experienced and have
limited tools. 
These are all good reasons, yet Peru and
Bolivia both have lowered their capital require-
ments for MFIs. Although the microfinance
requirements remain much higher than the
10 percent required for banks in these countries,
the reduced levels have helped spread the
breadth of microfinance in these countries.
These lowered requirements have not had dis-
astrous effects on the countries; rather, the MFIs
tend to hold more capital than is legally required
(The Economist Intelligence Unit). Currently in
Colombia, regulated MFIs are put under the
same stipulation as all banks, which have a CAR
minimum of 9 percent, but by lowering this
required ratio for MFIs, more may be willing
to become regulated and offer deposits to poor
civilians (The Economist Intelligence Unit).
Because each country is unique, the CAR should
be a relative figure. CAP guidelines have the CAR
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much higher than banks but best practices for
these banks would have these rates lower for
banks; MFI CAR rates should have the same
minimum as banks, which would allow an MFI
to determine its own CAR level.
Many regulators impose an unsecured
lending limit on banks; however, because the
portfolios of MFIs are composed primarily of
unsecured loans, this limit should be relaxed for
regulated MFIs. Studies have shown that these
unsecured portfolios perform well when the
financial system is running well, so this restric-
tion should be waived for MFIs that would be
crippled by such a requirement. Additionally,
loan-loss provision should be treated differently
for microloans versus regular loans. Loan-loss
provision should not be taken into effect until
after there is a delinquent loan, and this should
be treated more aggressively than if the loan
is secured (Christen et al.). In Peru, provision-
ing begins on a microloan after payment is a
week overdue and grows to 100 percent after
120 days (Vogel, p. 12). Because Peru has found
success with this policy in its practice as MFIs
have become more sustainable and market pen-
etration has expanded, Colombia should con-
sider instigating a similar process.
Nonprudential Regulation
Nonprudential regulation is mainly for the
benefit of the customers. This type of regulation
requires a level of transparency by the deposit-
holding institution and serves to protect the
consumer against confusing fees. Nonpruden-
tial regulations also call for clearly audited
financial statements so the institution can be
monitored easily. Best practices suggest that
nonprudential regulations are needed for all
MFIs, including MFIs that do not hold deposits.
This helps prevent uneducated clientele from
being taken advantage of through the use of
confusing terminology; transparency is neces-
sary so that borrowers know all the details
behind their loans (Vogel, p. 5).
Comparing Regulatory Environments
Peru is viewed as the highest-ranking
country for its regulatory environment for
microfinance (The Economist Intelligence
Unit). Peruvian microloans, loans without col-
lateral, are defined by the upper limit of U.S.
$7,000. Regulations for microfinance focus on
capital requirements and an assessment of a
client’s risk profile. A client’s risk profile is deter-
mined by borrowing history recorded in credit
bureaus, past borrowing with the MFI in ques-
tion, and ability to repay the loan as determined
by cash flow. The flexibility that the Peruvian
regulatory framework has shown over time
adapting to changes in knowledge about the rel-
atively new industry has paved the path for
the continual growth of the microfinance indus-
try in this country. Of the 19 largest MFIs in
Peru, only one is not regulated and cannot hold
deposits. Supervisory practices are focused on
internal controls and constantly remove rules
that may hinder flexibility and proficiency.
The focus of regulations on making it easier
for MFIs to operate has led to a self-sufficiency
of the microfinance industry in Peru, funded
largely by depositors. Fostered by this relaxed
regulatory environment, market penetration has
increased through the growth in borrowers,
interest rates have fallen through increased
competition, and deposits have increased (Vogel,
p. 10). 
Bolivia is the second-highest ranking reg-
ulatory environment for microfinance world-
wide, behind Peru (The Economist Intelli-
gence Unit). There are many similarities
between the regulatory environments of these
two countries, including malleability in allow-
ing a diversity of entities to issue microfi-
nance services and increased standards for
accounting that are in place to protect clients. 
Colombia should reference and model the
adaptable regulatory regimes put in place in
Peru and Bolivia. Using similar practices, such
as reducing CAR requirements and using a
unique regulatory framework specific to micro-
finance, will help more entities offer deposit-
holding services to poor Colombians who are
looking to save. At the same time, as in Peru,
increased market penetration and competition
may help decrease interest rates and foster
growth in both borrowers and depositors in
Colombia.
Interest Rates
The interest rate ceiling in Colombia is
the biggest deterrent keeping MFIs from
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becoming regulated institutions. As discussed
previously, WWB explicitly stated that the
interest rate cap is their biggest drawback
from becoming a regulated MFI. In a posi-
tive move along these lines, Colombian law
has raised the ceiling in 2011 from 39.89
percent to 50.2 percent (Castellanos). Never-
theless, the expenses of the highest cost loans
remain too high for MFIs to cover with this
still restrictive rate, which results in fewer
loans. The poorest of the poor are hit the hard-
est by the restrictions on interest rates. With
loans that are extremely small, a higher inter-
est rate is necessary in order to cover the costs
of providing a loan. Although regulators have
raised this ceiling, it is still an unnecessary
restraint. MFIs are hesitant to become regu-
lated entities with the power at the hands of
the government to reduce the interest rate cap
in the future.
To make up for costs not covered by inter-
est, many MFIs in Colombia charge fees, such
as required insurance or BCSC’s moratorium
fees for late payments (Banco Caja Social). These
fees decrease transparency for borrowers by
making it difficult to compare loan products
between MFIs. Not only does the lack of trans-
parency make it difficult for consumers, most
of whom are illiterate, but also it discourages
competitors from entering the industry because
they cannot make sense of the real costs (Robin-
son). NGOs choose to remain unregulated in
order to avoid the strict interest rate restric-
tions. 
Both Peru and Bolivia have removed inter-
est rate controls on all financial institutions,
allowing MFIs to be less fearful of becoming reg-
ulated entities (Vogel). By nature, MFIs need
to offer higher interest rates on their loans
because of their small size, high transaction
costs, and high risk. Many consider the high
interest rates as taking advantage of the poor;
however, as discussed previously, the alternative
means of financing available to the poor is from
moneylenders in the informal sector who offer
much higher interest rates (Rutherford and
Sukhwinder). It would be in the best interest
of the microfinance industry for the Colombian
government to abolish the interest rate caps put
in place on financial institutions so that more
MFIs are encouraged to become regulated insti-
tutions that may hold deposits.
Credit Bureaus
Credit bureaus are helpful in determining
the likelihood of a client of paying back a loan.
MFIs can assess cash flows and the character
of the borrower via a credit history. This is espe-
cially important in the microfinance industry
where there is a lack of collateral to back the
loans. The use of credit bureaus in Bolivia has
enabled a recovery in the microfinance indus-
try after an over-indebtedness problem—the
credit bureaus were able to track the borrow-
ings of clients across the country. The number
of nonregulated MFIs that have opted to partic-
ipate in credit bureaus has increased since the
crisis and the industry since has been stable.
Similarly, Nicaragua had a crisis related to an
over-indebtedness problem: in 2009, 40 percent
of active borrowers had outstanding loans from
more than one MFI (Chen et al., p. 7). Credit
bureaus are critical for enabling information
sharing to help MFIs restrict multiple borrow-
ing among clients. Colombia, with an abun-
dance of nonregulated MFIs not required to
report, is more susceptible to experiencing an
over-indebtedness problem for its poor because
there is no way to determine the number of
loans people take out from various nonregulated
MFIs (Vogel, p. 20). 
One innovative practice currently used
in Colombia by the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank is the bank’s partnership with
Medellin’s utility company, Empresas Públicas
de Medellín (EPM), to develop credit histories
for poor utility users. EPM created the Finan-
ciacion Social program, which provides afford-
able credit lines for the poor to purchase appli-
ances and information technology products.
EPM is able to adjust rates for customers with
whom they have a long relationship of issuing
credit. Repayment of these loans is reported to
one of Colombia’s credit bureaus helping con-
sumers develop credit histories, which may help
them obtain more financing in the future (Inter-
American Development Bank). 
Innovative practices like these are advis-
able in the nonregulated sector, especially for
lenders who may wish to become regulated
institutions in the future. The benefit of credit
bureaus for regulated institutions reflects
both on the consumer and the MFI itself. This
additional guidance will keep borrowers from
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taking on more debt than they can handle. On
the MFIs’ side, being better able to assess the
level of risk for each consumer will help them
reduce interest rates for borrowers who have a
history of good credit, even if this history is
not with the lender itself. This is particularly
helpful for borrowers who relocate within
Colombia so they do not need to start fresh at
each MFI.
Public Banks
Abolition of subsidized public banks that
provide below market rate services is also
necessary for the microfinance industry to
boom in Colombia. Public banks are notori-
ously inefficient, make it challenging for new
entrants to compete, and they often incur losses
the government later needs to restore. The pub-
lic banking system is corrupt in that these
banks provide subsidized loans to preferred
clients—often powerful groups in govern-
ment and politics. For instance, Colombia has
the third highest percentage of loans from pub-
lic banks going toward the public sector with
23.06 percent (Micco and Panizza, p. 39). The
return on assets (ROA) in these banks is lower
than in private banks; Micco and Panizza’s per-
formance indicators have Colombia’s ROA at 
–.0098, ranked the second lowest in Latin
America. This may be an indicator that these
banks are lending to preferred clients on
unprofitable projects. Additionally, people
choose to put their money in public banks with
the belief that the government backs their
deposits. This deters development of competi-
tors by turning depositors away from commer-
cial banks. State ownership of banks in Colom-
bia was 57 percent in 1970 and 75 percent in
1985 and then declined to 53 percent in 1995,
while in Bolivia, the share went from 53 per-
cent to 69 percent and down to 18 percent 
in those same years. Bolivia has since com-
pletely eliminated the public banking sector
while Colombia continues to use public banks.
Likewise, Peru has removed subsidies for banks,
essentially eliminating the public banking
sector (Micco and Panizza). Where public banks
are available, the private sector is reluctant to
compete with the subsidies and regulatory
favoritism. It has been shown that many peo-
ple view loans from public banks as charity, 
and because of this they do not pay back their
loans. The inefficient public banks in Colombia
should be eliminated, helping to pave the way
for the microfinance industry to blossom in
Colombia.
Colombia’s state bank, Banagrario, holds
26 percent of Colombia’s microcredit portfolio
but is considered an MFI and is not covered by
MixMarket. This state-run agricultural develop-
ment bank finances mainly rural, agricultural,
livestock, fishing, forestry, and agro-industrial
sectors (Banco Agrario de Colombia). Bana-
grario is a dominant competitor with the MFIs
operating in Colombia. To compare market
shares, the NGOs, FMM Popaján and WBB, have
14.1 percent and 8.9 percent, respectively, and
the bank Bancamía has 18.6 percent market
shares (MixMarket). With such a large, gov-
ernment-supported bank competing in the
microfinance market, it is incredibly difficult for
MFIs to serve clients who work in the agricul-
tural market. 
Conclusion
The comparatively hostile regulatory envi-
ronment in Colombia causes many MFIs to be
apprehensive about becoming regulated insti-
tutions. Unregulated MFIs are limited in the
services they can offer clients and are often
dependent on donor funds. Yet, savings and
deposit-holding services have proved to be some
of the most desired services for the unbanked.
Additionally, donor independence has proved, in
various studies, to help MFIs grow and cover
more of the potential market. Colombia has the
potential to have one of the largest microfinance
industries in the world, but the regulatory envi-
ronment is crippling the country’s ability to cap-
ture the market and provide much-needed bank-
ing services to the poor. Adapting the regulatory
system in Colombia is key for the country to
reach the levels of market penetration seen in
its neighboring countries, Peru and Bolivia.
In order for MFIs to offer deposit and other
services to clients, they must have both pruden-
tial and nonprudential regulatory practices.
Modeling prudential regulation after Peru and
Bolivia, Colombia should consider relaxing cap-
ital requirements for MFIs. Similarly, best prac-
tice nonprudential regulations suggest abolish-
ing the interest rate ceiling in Colombia. With
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the interest rate ceiling, many MFIs use fees
to cover the costs of lending small loans or sim-
ply do not offer extremely small loans for which
they are not able to cover the cost. This elimi-
nates many of the poor from acquiring financial
services, opposing microfinance’s goal of full
financial inclusion. Public banks, notoriously
inefficient and often viewed as charity, use
subsidies and perceptions of government guar-
antees to lure clients away from the microfi-
nance industry. 
Additionally, access to credit histories of
borrowers through credit bureaus would help
keep borrowers from becoming over-indebted
as well as help them build a widely used credit
history. The goal of microfinance is to provide
financial services to the world’s poor, and, by
strengthening information sharing and trans-
parency, while relaxing other elements of the
regulatory environment in Colombia, MFIs
would be able to offer more services to those
in need.
Colombia has begun working on devel-
oping a new regulatory framework regarding
microfinancial activity of regulated entities.
Hopefully, this new framework, by following
best practices and abolishing restricting laws,
will give the microfinance industry in Colom-
bia a better chance to grow. Already several
influential players have become regulated and,
as time progresses, many others may join. The
26 members of the national association of
Colombian MFIs, Asomicrofinanzas, account for
90 percent of the market. They build plat-
forms to collect, manage, and disseminate infor-
mation about the market and have started work-
ing with the government’s Superintendencia
Financiera to compose this new regulatory
regime. These positive steps toward providing a
unique framework for regulating MFIs in the
country will help pave the way for the microfi-
nancial industry to expand its horizons and
spread much-needed access to financial services
to Colombia’s poor. 
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